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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to §78-2-2{j), U.C.A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was summary judgment in favor of Liberty Mutual 
warranted under the facts in this case? 
2. Did Baxters and Boulter state a cause of action 
against Liberty Mutual in their counterclaim which could be 
the matter of summary judgment proceedings? 
3. Does the insured have a first party cause of 
action against their own carrier, who had written uninsured 
motorist, for failure to bargain in good faith? 
4. Do the Baxters and Boulter have a cause of action 
entitling them to have the issue of punitive damages decided 
by the trier of facts? 
STANDARD OF APPELLANT REVIEW 
The trial court granted Liberty Mutual summary 
judgment as a matter of law on the issue of its breech of duty 
of good faith and fair dealing. Granting summary judgment on 
this issue rendered the court's consideration of the other 
issues moot. Because the trial court granted summary judgment 
as a matter of law, the appellate court need not give 
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions and should 
review the issue de novo. In specifying the standard of 
review for summary judgment, the court in Pixton v. State 
Farm, stated: "Because summary judgment is not granted as a 
matter of fact, but rather as a matter of law, the trial 
court's legal conclusions are to be reviewed for correctness." 
809 P.2d at 748. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND ADMINISTRATIVE RULES 
Utah Code Ann., §31A-23-219 
Utah Code Ann., §3lA-26-303(4) 
Utah Code Ann., §3lA-26-303(5) 
Utah Code Ann., §78-18-1(1)(a) 
Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Rule, R.540-89 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Jaren and Joanne Baxter ("Baxter") and Mary Ellen 
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Boulter ("Boulter") defendants and counterclaimants below 
appeal a summary judgment order granted in favor of Liberty 
Mutual Insurance Group ("Liberty Mutual"), the plaintiff 
below. Liberty Mutual sought declaratory relief to determine 
that one Daryl Crape, an alleged tortfeasor was an insured 
motorist and to set aside a default judgment that was granted 
to Baxters and Boulter due to an accident involving Crape as 
an uninsured motorist. The trial court ruled that the default 
judgment was binding on Liberty Mutual for purposes of an 
uninsured motorist provision in it's insurance contract with 
Baxters and Boulter. Baxters and Boulter in the civil action 
being the subject of this appeal filed a counterclaim against 
Liberty Mutual for a breach of its duty to act in good faith 
and to deal fairly. Liberty Mutual finally paid on the 
uninsured motorist claim, leaving the issue of the 
counterclaim in which Liberty Mutual was granted summary 
judgment. It is this summary judgment that is the subject of 
this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Joanne Baxter as the driver of a vehicle insured 
by Liberty Mutual and Baxter's mother, Mary Ellen Boulter, who 
was a passenger, were involved in an automobile accident on 
April 28, 1989. (R. at 334) 
2. Daryl Crape was the driver of the vehicle which 
collided with Baxter's vehicle. (R. at 334) 
-3-
3. Jaren Baxter, husband of Joanne Baxter, contacted 
Liberty Mutual and informed it of the accident on April 28, 
1989, (R. at 239) the same day of the accident. 
4. After not receiving any information from either 
Mr. Crape nor Liberty Mutual, Robert M. McRae, counsel for 
Baxters and Boulter, informed Liberty Mutual, in writing, on 
July 12, 1989, that a possible uninsured motorist claim 
existed. (R. at 340) 
5. On August 24, 1989, Liberty Mutual sent a letter 
to McRae stating it would wait for evidence regarding the 
uninsured motorist situation from McRae's office. (R. at 346) 
6. After hearing nothing more from Liberty Mutual, a 
default judgment was obtained against Crape on October 16, 
1989. (R. at 354) 
7. On October 30, 1989, McRae sent Liberty Mutual 
notice of default judgment obtained against Crape and inquired 
as to whether Liberty Mutual was going to pay on the claim. 
(R. at 348) 
8. After no further contact, on January 4, 1990, 
Liberty Mutual filed a Declaratory Complaint seeking a 
declaration as to whether the default judgment against Crape 
was binding for purposes of the uninsured motorist claim and 
to also set aside the default judgment. (R. at 02-08) 
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9. On July 5, 1990, Baxters and Boulter amended their 
answer and added a counterclaim against Liberty Mutual wherein 
it argue that Liberty Mutual by its conduct did breach its 
duty of good faith and fair dealing. (R. at 365-67) 
10. Several motions were filed by Liberty Mutual's 
counsel in this case attempting to obtain partial summary 
judgment which were denied. (R. at 193, 407) 
11. A final order in the Crape case denying said 
motions was entered on August 13, 1991, denying a motion filed 
by Liberty Mutual's counsel to set aside the default judgment 
against Crape. (R. at 407) 
12. Liberty Mutual tendered payment of $20,000.00 to 
Baxters and $8,500.00 to Boulter, plus interest, to settle the 
Crape case, which tender was accepted. (R. at 310) 
13. Liberty Mutual filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment on November 15, 1991, seeking to have the bad faith 
claim dismissed. (R. at 422) 
14. Summary Judgment was granted in favor of Liberty 
Mutual on December 23, 1991. (R. at 460) 
15. It is this grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Liberty Mutual that is the subject of this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In granting summary judgment in favor of Liberty 
Mutual, the trial court relied on the Memorandum in Support of 
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Summary Judgment provided by Liberty Mutual. The authorities 
relied on however, are easily distinguishable from this case. 
The facts in this cases give rise to an action based on 
Liberty Mutual's breach of its duty to act in good faith and 
to deal fairly with its insureds, Baxters and Boulter. This 
breach caused Baxters and Boulter to sustain substantial 
damages. This Court should remand the case to the district 
court for a trial on the merits. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF LIBERTY MUTUAL WAS 
NOT WARRANTED UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE 
In Pixton v. State Farm, 809 P.2d 746, 48 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991) the Utah Court of Appeals stated that summary 
judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. (Citing Ehlers & Ehlers Architects v. Carbon 
County, 805 P.2d 789, 791 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Shire Dev. v. 
Frontier Inv., 799 P.2d 221, 222-23 [Utah Ct. App. 1990]). 
The facts and inferences are to be viewed in a light most 
favorable to the losing party and the judgment is to be 
affirmed only where there is no genuine dispute as to a 
material fact or where, viewing the facts as contended by the 
losing party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
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matter of law. Id. Because summary judgment is not granted 
as a matter of fact, but rather as matter of law, the trial 
court's legal conclusions are to be reviewed for correctness. 
Id, In this case the District Court below, relying on Liberty 
Mutual*s Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, found that 
Utah case law holds that summary judgment is appropriate in 
insurance cases where there is an issue of bad faith, even 
though that issue is disputed. (R. at 312-13, 459-60). Under 
the facts of this case, however, summary judgment in favor of 
Liberty Mutual was not appropriate and none of the authority 
relied on in the court below so holds. 
The authority relied upon by the court below on this 
issue consists primarily of three Utah appellate cases. The 
first case is Pixton v. State Farm, supra (R. at 312). Pixton 
involved a third-party claim against an insured's insurer 
based on a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. 
809 P.2d at 747. The trial court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the insurer, notwithstanding the existence of an 
affidavit of an expert stating that the insurer had breached 
its duties of good faith and fair dealing, thereby creating a 
disputed issue. Id, The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed, 
holding that there is no duty of good faith and fair dealing 
running from an insurer to a third-party where there is no 
privity of contract. Id. at 751. The court stated that the 
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expert witness1 affidavit was simply irrelevant as there was 
no duty owed by the insurer. 
While Pixton is undisputedly the law in Utah as to 
third-party bad faith claims, the present case involves 
first-party claimants. There is direct privity of contract 
between Liberty Mutual and its insureds, Baxters and Boulter. 
This first-party claimant action based on a breach of the duty 
of an insurer to deal fairly and act in good faith with its 
insured was recognized in Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 
795 (Utah 1985). Beck involved an insured who sought damages 
against his insurer as a first-party claimant due to the 
insurer's breach of its duty of good faith and fair dealing. 
Id. at 796#97. Beck will be discussed in greater detail in 
Point II. 
The court below also relied on Arnica Mutual Ins. Co. 
v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). (R. at 312) 
Arnica involved a claimant who alleged bad faith against his 
insurance company based on the insurance company assisting a 
county attorney to prosecute the claimant for insurance 
fraud. j[d. at 958. Similarly, the court below further relied 
on Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co,, 745 P.2d 838 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987). (R. at 312) Callioux also involved allegations 
of insurance fraud against its insured. Ld. at 839. The 
alleged bad faith consisted of the insurer delaying payment 
during criminal proceedings for insurance fraud against the 
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claimant. J[(3. at 839. It is important to note that 
immediately following the proceedings, the insured tendered 
payment to the exonerated claimant. Ld. The Court of Appeals 
held in both cases that summary judgment was appropriate. 
The facts of this case are much different than any of 
the cases relied on by the District Court below. Point II 
discusses how, even taking Liberty Mutual's version of the 
facts, its conduct constitutes a clear breach of its duty of 
good faith and fair dealing that it owed to its insureds, 
Baxters and Boulter. 
POINT II 
LIBERTY MUTUAL1S CONDUCT CONSTITUTED A BREACH OF ITS 
DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING THEREBY GIVING 
BAXTERS AND BOULTER A CAUSE OF ACTION. 
Baxters' and Boulter's counterclaim alleged that 
Liberty Mutual breached its duty of good faith and fair 
dealing in one or more of the following respects: 
a) Failure to timely and diligently investigate its 
liability exposure to its insured; 
b) . . . 
c) Failure to act in good faith in performing its 
implied contractual obligation to a first-party 
insurance contract claim; 
d) . . . 
(R. at 42-45) 
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It is useful to examine this standard of good faith 
and fair dealing that was recognized in Beck. Justice 
Zimmerman, speaking for the Court, stated: 
the implied obligation of good faith performance 
contemplates, at the very least, that the insurer will 
diligently investigate the facts to enable it to 
determine whether a claim is valid, will fairly 
evaluate the claim, and will thereafter act promptly 
and reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim. 
The duty of good faith also requires the insurer to 
deal with laymen as laymen and not as experts in the 
subtleties of law and underwriting and to refrain from 
actions that will injure the insured's ability to 
obtain the benefits of the contract. These 
performances are the essence of what the insured has 
bargained and paid for, and the insurer has the 
obligation to perform them. When an insurer has 
breached this duty, it is liable for damages suffered 
in consequence of that breach. 
701 P.2d at 801. (Citations omitted) 
To further define this standard of good faith and fair 
dealing, we look to Utah Code Ann. §3lA-26-303(4). This 
section empowers the Insurance Commissioner to define by rule, 
acts or general business practices which are unfair claim 
settlement practices. The Commissioner, pursuant to this 
statute, has promulgated Rule R540-89 entitled Unfair Claims 
Settlement Practices Rule. The pertinent sections of this 
rule are: 
R540-89-10. FAILURE TO ACKNOWLEDGE PERTINENT 
COMMUNICATIONS. A. Every insurer, upon receiving 
notification of a claim shall, within 15 days, 
acknowledge the receipt of such notice unless payment 
is made within such period of time, . . . 
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R540-89-11. STANDARD FOR PROMPT INVESTIGATION OF 
CLAIMS. Every insurer shall complete investigation of 
a claim within 45 days after notification of claim,. . 
R540-89-12. MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR PROMPT, FAIR AND 
EQUITABLE SETTLEMENTS APPLICABLE TO ALL INSUREDS. 
B. Within 30 days after receipt by the insurer of 
properly executed notice of loss, the insurer shall 
complete its investigation of the claim and the first 
party claimant shall be advised of the acceptance or 
denial of the claim by the insurer unless the 
investigation cannot be completed within 30 days the 
insurer shall so communicate to the claimant and shall 
continue to communicate every 30 days until the claim 
is either paid or denied. 
Id. 
The facts in this case are undisputed. Even looking 
to Liberty Mutual's version of the facts, Baxters and Boulter 
can show that Liberty Mutual clearly breached its duty of good 
faith and fair dealing with them. To examine Liberty Mutual's 
version of the facts, we turn to its Memorandum in Support of 
its Motion for Summary Judgment. Again it is important to 
note that these are the same facts relied on by the District 
Court in its Order granting Summary Judgment. (R. at 459-60) 
The facts state that on July 12, 1989, counsel for 
Baxters provided Liberty Mutual with a copy of the Summons, 
Complaint and Return of Service in the lawsuit initiated 
against Crape by Baxters and Boulter. Baxters and Boulter 
however claim that notice was given to Liberty Mutual on the 
same day as the accident. (R. at 239) Also included in this 
correspondence was a letter from counsel which stated that 
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there was evidence that Crape was uninsured. On August 24, 
1989# some 43 days later, Liberty Mutual wrote to counsel for 
Baxters and Boulter acknowledging the claim and stating that a 
file would be opened. In this letter Liberty Mutual stated 
that it would await evidence regarding the uninsured motorist 
claim from Baxters1 and Boulter's counsel, (Addendum E) 
After hearing nothing more from Liberty Mutual, 
counsel for Baxters and Boulter sent a letter to Liberty 
Mutual that was received on October 30, 1989. (Addendum F) 
The letter informed Liberty Mutual that a default judgment had 
been entered against Crape. The letter also asked whether 
Liberty Mutual was going to pay on the uninsured motor claim. 
About 67 days later, on January 4, 1990, and without any 
further contact with Baxters, Boulter, or their counsel, 
Liberty Mutual filed this complaint seeking a declaration as 
to whether the default judgment was binding for the purposes 
of the uninsured motorist coverage and whether or not Crape 
was insured. 
On or about March 21, 1990, Baxters and Boulter 
certified the matter as being ready for trial. Liberty Mutual 
objected and the Court agreed the matter was not ready for 
trial. On or About July 5, 1990, Baxters and Boulter added a 
counterclaim against Liberty Mutual for breaching its duty of 
good faith and fair dealing with its insureds. On December 
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28, 1990# Liberty Mutual filed a Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment seeking to have the default judgment held to not be 
binding upon it and to set it aside* This motion was denied 
on August 13, 1991. Final judgment was also entered on that 
date. (R. at 407) 
On October 28, 1991, Liberty Mutual filed another 
summary judgment motion seeking to have the bad faith claim 
dismissed. (R. at 260) Liberty Mutual then tendered payment 
of the uninsured motorist policy limits to Baxter, and paid 
Boulter, the judgment amount of $8,500.00 plus interest, after 
more than two and one-half years of delay. (R. at 263) 
(R. at 301-11) 
It is the granting of Liberty Mutual's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the bad faith claim that is the subject of 
this appeal. 
Liberty Mutual has breached its duty of good faith and 
fair dealing to its insureds many times throughout the course 
of the claim maintained by Baxters and Boulter. The first 
instance of this breach was the 43 days it took Liberty Mutual 
to acknowledge the receipt of the claim. This was nearly 
three times as long as the 15 day standard set forth in the 
insurance rules. Liberty Mutual's next effort to respond to 
the claim was when it filed a declaratory complaint, 67 days 
after Baxters1 and Boulter's counsel had notified Liberty 
Mutual regarding the default proceedings and renewing the 
claim. Although a declaratory complaint was filed 67 days 
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after contact by Baxters' and Boulter's counsel, over 130 days 
had lapsed without Liberty Mutual making any attempt to 
investigate or resolve the matter. Again this is not taking 
into account that initial notification of the claim was made 
on the day of tBfe accident. 
Liberty Mutual breached its duty of good faith and 
fair dealing in several other respects as well. It breached 
its duty by not meeting the 45 day standard to complete its 
investigation of the claim when it was first made. In fact, 
Liberty Mutual did not make any attempt to investigate the 
claim. Further Liberty Mutual breached the 30 day contact 
standard, as there was only a single instance where it 
corresponded with its insureds between it receiving 
notification of the claim on the accident date of April 28, 
1989, a letter to Boulter's counsel wanting evidence of 
Crape's uninsured status dated August 12, 1989 (Addendum F) 
and the filing of the Declaratory Complaint in January of 
1990. There was a total lack of promptness and diligence in 
the way Liberty Mutual handled this claim. Liberty Mutual 
having not make any attempt to investigate the claim, it did 
not provide any assistance to do so. 
Liberty Mutual argued in its Motion for Summary 
Judgment that the insurance rules specifying various time 
limits within which insurance companies have to act do not 
create a cause of action for private parties. (R.318) This 
is true. The statute authorizing these rules states: "This 
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section does not create any private cause of action." Utah 
Code Ann. §3lA-26-303(5), Baxters and Boulter, however, do 
not base their counterclaim on these rules. Rather they base 
their cause of action on the implied duty of good faith and 
fair dealing that was recognized in Beck. The insurance rules 
merely reflect standards of and help define the insurer's duty 
of good faith and fair dealing. As Section R540-89-12 of the 
Rule states, the purpose of the Rule is to "establish 
standards of equity and good faith to guide licensees 
[insurance companies] in the settlement of claims." Id. 
Liberty Mutual also argued that its filing of a 
Declaratory Complaint did not constitute bad faith. (R.at 32) 
It argued that it has the right to adjudicate its rights and 
obligations in this situation. While Baxters and Boulter 
believe the litigation initiated by Liberty Mutual to be a 
dilatory tactic, they agree that an insurer has the right to 
delay payment if there is a fairly debatable issue. The 
thrust, however, of Baxters' and Boulter's argument is that 
Liberty Mutual's breach of its duty of good faith began from 
its conduct prior to the filing of the Declaratory Complaint. 
The failure to timely acknowledge, investigate, and correspond 
to the claim are what give substance to Baxters' and Boulter's 
cause of action. There was no fairly debatable issue during 
this time. Even if there was, Liberty Mutual was obligated 
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under its duty to act in good faith to notify Baxters and 
Boulter of this and to correspond regularly, both of which 
never took place. Liberty Mutual at all times prior to paying 
its uninsured policy liabilty to Baxters and Boulter had the 
right to settle with them at its insureds, take an assignment 
of their subrogation rights and pursue Crape and/or his 
liability carrier for reimbursement, Counterclaimants had no 
right to preclude Liberty Mutual from this contractural or 
common law right* 
POINT III 
BAXTERS AND BOULTER ARE ENTITLED TO DAMAGES AS A 
RESULT OF LIBERTY MUTUAL *S CONDUCT 
A, Baxters And Boulter Are Entitled to Damages 
Suffered As A Consequence Of Liberty Mutual's 
Breach of Its Duty Of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
The Beck court held that there is no reason to limit 
damages recoverable for breach of a duty to investigate, 
bargain and settle claims in good faith to the amount 
specified in the insurance policy, 701 P.2d at 801. The 
court further stated that these damages include both general 
and consequential damages. 16^. Among several classes of 
damages including attorney's fees (Collier v. Heinz, 182 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 53, Court of Appeals, 1992) are mental anguish and 
economic hardship. Beck at 802,03. (Citations omitted). 
This broad range of damages available to an insured who has 
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suffered an insurer's breach of its duty of good faith was 
also confirmed in Crookston v. Fire Exchange, 164 Utah Adv. 
Rep, 3, 10 (Utah 1991). In this case Baxters and Boulter have 
incurred substantial attorney fees in pursuing their claim. 
They have also claimed damages including but not limited to 
pain and suffering, mental anguish, economic hardship, 
psychological damage, emotional distress, loss of enjoyment of 
life, all due to Liberty Mutual's breach of its duty of good 
faith and fair dealing. Baxters and Boulter have a right to 
be compensated for the damages resulting from this breach. 
B. There Is Sufficient Evidence to Have The 
Issue of Punitive Damages Decided By The Trier 
Of Fact. 
The standard for punitive damages is spelled out in 
Utah Code Ann. §78-18-1(1) (a), which states that before any 
punitive damages can be awarded, the finder of fact must be 
shown by "clear and convincing evidence that the acts or 
omissions by the tort feasor are the result of wilful and 
malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that 
manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and 
disregard of, the rights of others." 
Id. 
Beck states that it contemplates something beyond a 
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing for punitive 
damages. 701 P.2d at 800. Beck distinguishes between an 
action in tort and one in contract, the former being necessary 
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for punitive damages. _Id. The court, in clarifying this 
point, said that the acts constituting a breach of contract 
may also result in breaches of duty that are independent of 
contract and may give rise to causes of action in tort. Id. 
at fn 3. 
This language in Beck is joined by Crookston which 
allowed punitive damages on an insurance contract action where 
a breach of good faith was alleged. 164 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. 
The court, in Crookston however, remanded the punitive damage 
award to the trial court on the issue of excessiveness. Id. 
at 15 
Liberty Mutual committed acts which gave rise to 
punitive damages when it breached its duty of good faith and 
fair dealing with Baxters and Boulter. A specific example of 
this disregard for its insureds1 rights occurred when Liberty 
Mutual misrepresented the law on how long it had to decide 
whether it was going to pay on the claim. A Liberty Mutual 
representative on numerous occasions told its insured that it 
had no obligation to act on the claim until the passing of one 
year. (R. at 432) 
This misrepresentation and acts like it constitutes a 
"reckless indifference toward, and disregard of, the rights of 
others" Baxters and Boulter should have their chance to 
present evidence to the trier of fact on this issue. 
-18-
CONCLUSION 
Baxters and Boulter have shown that Liberty Mutual by 
its conduct throughout the history of the claim breached its 
duty to act in good faith and to deal fairly with its 
insured. The failure to acknowledge, investigate and 
correspond to the claim all manifest a gross display of 
indifference on the part of Liberty Mutual. Due to this 
breach, Baxters and Boulter have incurred substantial 
damages. This Court must review the facts in a light most 
favorable to them, and in so doing, it should remand this case 
back to the trial court for a trial on tj 
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ADDENDUM A 
INSURANCE MARKETING 31A-23-219 
(4) Neither the commissioner nor the state of Utah may be held liable 
for errors or omissions of the former agent or broker or the trustee. The 
trustee may not be held liable for errors and omissions which were caused 
in any material way by the negligence of the former agent or broker. The 
trustee may be held liable for errors and omissions which arise solely 
from the trusteed negligence. The trustee's compensation level shall be 
sufficient to allow the trustee to purchase errors and omissions coverage, 
if that coverage is not provided the trustee by the former agent or broker 
or his successor in interest. 
(5) It is a breach of the trustee's fiduciary duty to capture the accounts 
of trustor's clients, either directly or indirectly. The trustee may not pur-
chase the accounts or expiration lists of the former agent or broker, unless 
the commissioner expressly ratifies the terms of the sale. The commis-
sioner may adopt rules which further define the trustee's fiduciary duties 
and explain how the trustee is to carry out his responsibilities. 
(6) The trust may be terminated by the commissioner or by the person 
that requested the trust be established. The trust is terminated by writ-
ten notice being delivered to the trustee and the commissioner. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-23-218, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 28. 
31A-23-219, Appointment and listing of insurance agents. 
(1) An insurer may appoint natural persons and organizations that have 
insurance agent or managing general agent licenses to be insurance agents to 
do business for the insurer in this state. All insurers shall report to the com-
missioner, at intervals and in the form he establishes by rule, all new appoint-
ments and all terminations of appointments. All insurers shall submit to the 
commissioner on or before July 1st of each odd-numbered year a list of all 
agent appointments then in force in this state. 
(2) The commissioner may require an insurer to report the cause of termi-
nation of an agent's appointment. The information shall remain confidential. 
No action may be brought against an insurer for anything given in those 
reports. 
(3) If an insurer appoints an organization as its agent, the insurer need not 
appoint, report, or pay appointment reporting fees for natural person agents 
listed on the organization's agent's license under Section 31A-23-212. 
(4) Each insurer shall maintain with the department, on forms supplied by 
the department, and signed by the president and secretary of the insurer, a 
list of natural persons with authority to appoint and remove the company's 
agents in this state. The insurer shall submit the reports to the commissioner 
pursuant to Subsection (1). 
(5) If an insurer lists a licensee as its agent in reports submitted under 
Subsection (1), there is a rebuttable presumption that in placing a risk with 
the insurer the appointed licensee or any of his licensed employees acted as 
the insurer's agent and not as a broker. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-23-219, enacted by Cross-References. — Insurance agents, 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 28; 1986, ch. 204, § 197. brokers and a^usters, § 31A-23-102 et seq. 
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(4) A licensee under this chapter whose license is suspended, revoked, or 
lapsed, but who continues to act as a licensee, is subject to the penalties for 
conducting an insurance business without a license. 
(5) An order revoking a license under Subsection (2) may specify a time not 
to exceed five years within which the former licensee may not apply for a new 
license. If no time is specified, the former licensee may not apply for a new 
license for five years without the express approval of the commissioner. 
(6) Any person whose license is suspended or revoked under Subsection (2) 
shall, when the suspension ends or a new license is issued, pay all fees that 
would have been payable if the license had not been suspended or revoked, 
unless the commissioner by order waives the payment of the interim fees. If a 
new license is issued more than three years after the revocation of a similar 
license, this subsection applies only to the fees that would have accrued dur-
ing the three years immediately following the revocation. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-26-213, enacted by the former second sentence, which read WA li-
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 31; 1990, ch. 327, § 15. cense which has lapsed under this subsection 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- may be reinstated if the licensee, within 90 
ment, effective April 23, 1990, substituted the days after license lapse, pays twice the usual 
present second sentence in Subsection (3) for renewal fee." 
31A-26-214. Probation. 
(1) In any circumstances that would justify a suspension under Section 
31A-26-213, the commissioner may instead, after a formal adjudicative pro-
ceeding, put the licensee on probation for a specified period no longer than 12 
months. 
(2) The probation order shall state the conditions for retention of the li-
cense, which shall be reasonable. 
(3) Violation of the probation is grounds for immediate revocation without 
a formal adjudicative proceeding, unless one is requested. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-26-214, enacted by substituted "formal adjudicative proceeding" 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 31; 1987, ch. 161, § 86. for "hearing", and, in Subsection (3), substi-
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- tuted "one is requested" for "a hearing is re-
ment, effective January 1,1988, added the sub- quested under Subsection 31A-2-30K3)" at the 
section designations, in Subsections (1) and (3), end. 
PART III 
CLAIM PRACTICES 
31A-26-301. Timely payment of claims. 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by law, an insurer shall timely pay every 
valid insurance claim made by an insured. By rule the commissioner may 
prescribe the kinds of notice and proof of loss that will establish validity, the 
manner in which an insurer may make a bona fide denial of a claim, the 
periods of time within which payment is required to be made to be timely, and 
the reasonable interest rates to be charged upon late claim payments. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the payment of a claim is not overdue 
during any period in which the insurer is unable to pay the claim because 
there is no recipient legally able to give a valid release for the payment, or in 
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which the insurer is unable to determine who is entitled to receive the pay-
ment, provided that the insurer has promptly notified the claimant of the 
inability and has offered in good faith to pay the claim promptly when the 
inability is removed. 
(3) This section applies only to claims made by claimants in direct privity of 
contract with the insurer. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-26-301, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 31. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Liability insurance third party's Policy provision limiting time within which 
right of action for insurer's bad faith tactics action may be brought on the policy as apphca-
designed to delay payment of claim, 62 ble to tort action by insured against insurer, 66 
ALR4th 1113 ALR4th 859. 
31A-26-302. Settlement of claims in credit life and disabil-
ity insurance, 
(1) The creditor shall promptly report all claims to the insurer or its desig-
nated claim representative The insurer shall maintain adequate claims files. 
All claims shall be settled as soon as possible in accordance with the terms of 
the insurance contract. 
(2) The insurer shall pay all claims either by draft drawn upon the insurer 
or by check ol the insurer to the order of the claimant to whom payment of the 
claim is due pursuant to the policy provisions, or upon direction of that claim-
ant to another. 
(3) No person other than the insurer or its designated claim representative 
may settle or adjust claims. The creditor may not be designated as a claims 
representative. 
History. C. 1953, 31A-26-302, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 31. 
31A-26-303. Unfair claim settlement practices. 
(1) No insurer or person representing an insurer may engage in any unfair 
claim settlement practice under Subsections (2), (3), and (4). 
(2) Each of the following acts is an unfair claim settlement practice: 
(a) knowingly misrepresenting material facts or the contents of insur-
ance policy provisions at issue in connection with a claim under an insur-
ance contract; however, this provision does not include the failure to 
disclose information; 
(b) attempting to use a policy application which was altered by the 
insurer without notice to, or knowledge, or consent of, the insured as the 
basis for settling or refusing to settle a claim; or 
(c) failing to settles claim promptly under one portion of the insurance 
policy cove?ageT~wTIere fiaHlftjT and the amount of loss are reasonably 
clear, in order to influence settlements under other portions of the insur-
ance policy coverage, but this Subsection (2)(c) applies only to claims 
made by persons in direct privity of contract with the insurer. 
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(3) Each of the following is an unfair claim settlement practice if committed 
or performed with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice by 
an insurer or persons representing an insurer: 
(a) failing to acknowledge and act promptly upon communications 
about claims under insurance policies; 
(b) failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt 
investigation and processing olTcIaimsninder insurance policies; 
(c) compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due 
under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts 
ultimately recovered in actions brought by those insureds when the 
amounts claimed were reasonably near to the amounts recovered; 
(d) failing, after payment of a claim, to inform insureds or beneficia-
ries, upon request by them, of the coverage under which payment was 
made; 
(e) failing to'promptly provide to the insured a reasonable explanation 
of the basis for denial of a claim or for the offer of a compromise settle-
ment; 
(f) appealing from substantially all arbitration awards in favor of in-
sureds for the purpose of compelling them to accept settlements or com-
promises for less than the amount awarded in arbitration; 
(g) delaying the investigation or payment of claims by requiring an 
insured, claimant, or the physician of either to submit a preliminary 
claim report and then requiring the subsequent submission of formal 
proof of loss forms which contain substantially the same information; or 
(h) not attempting in good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equi-
table settlement of claims in which liability is reasonably clear. 
(4)^  The commissioner may define by rule, acts or general business practices 
which are unfair claim settlement practices, after a„findI5tlRat those prac-
tices^^lcnisiea3ing, deceptive, unfairly discriminatory, overreaching, or an 
unreasonable restraint on competition. " ~ ~ ~ ~ 
" (5) This section does not create any private cause of action. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-26-303, enacted by Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 31; 1986, ch. 204, § 218; ment, in Subsection (2)(c), substituted "this 
1987, ch. 91, § 61. Subsection (2)<c)" for "this Subsection (l)(c)." 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Liability of independent or public waiver of, or estoppel to assert, "no-action" 
insurance adjuster to insured for conduct in ad- clause, 68 A.L R.4th 389. 
justing claim, 50 A L R.4th 900. Pre-emption by Longshore and Harbor 
Duty of insurer to pay for independent coun- Workers' Compensation Act (33 USCS §§ 901 
sel when conflict of interest exists between in- et seq.) of state law claims for bad-faith deahng 
sured and insurer, 50 A.L.R.4th 932. by insurer or agent of insurer, 90 A.L.R. Fed 
Liability insurer's post-loss conduct as 723 
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CHAPTER 18 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS 
Section Section 
78 18 1 Basis for punitive damages 78-18 2 Drug exception 
awards — Section inapplicable 
to DUI cases — Division of 
award with state 
78-18-1- Basis for punitive damages awards — Section in. 
applicable to DUI cases — Division of award with 
state. 
(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive damages may be 
awarded only if compensatory or general damages are awarded and it is 
established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of 
the tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally 
fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless 
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others 
(b) The limitations, standards of evidence, and standards of conduct of 
Subsection (l)(a) do not apply to any claim for punitive damages arising 
out of the tortfeasor's operation of a motor vehicle while voluntarily in-
toxicated or under the influence of any drug or combination of alcohol and 
drugs as prohibited by Section 41-6-44 
(c) The award of a penalty under Section 78-11-15 or 78-11-16 regard-
ing shoplifting is not subject to the prior award of compensatory or gen-
eral damages under Subsection QKa) whether or not restitution has been 
paid to the merchant prior to or as a part of a civil action under Section 
78-11-15 or 78-11-16. 
(2) Evidence of a party's wealth or financial condition shall be admissible 
only after a finding of liability for punitive damages has been made. 
(3) In any judgment where punitive damages are awarded and paid, 50% of 
the amount of the punitive damages m excess of $20,000 shall, after payment 
of attorneys' fees and costs, be remitted to the state treasurer for deposit into 
the General Fund 
History: C. 1953, 78-18-1, enacted by L. Applicability. — Laws 1989, ch 237, § 4 
1989, ch. 237, § 1; 1991, ch. 6, § 4. provides that the act applies to all claims for 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- punitive damages that arise on or after May 1, 
ment, effective April 29, 1991, made a stylistic 1989 
change in Subsection (1Kb) and added Subsec- Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch 237, § 4 
tion (l)(c) makes the act effective on May 1, 1989 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments A.L.R. — Punitive damages relationship to 
m Utah Law — Legislative Enactments — defendant's wealth as factor m determining 
Tort Law, 1990 Utah L Rev 269 propriety of award, 87 ALR4th 141 
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Rule R540-89 
UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES RULE 
Section 
R540-89-1. Authority. 
R540-89-2. Purpose. 
R540-89-3. Scope. 
R540-89-4. Definitions. 
R540-89-6. Notice of loss. 
R540-89-6. Proof of loss. 
R540-89-7. Unfair methods, deceptive acts and practices defined. 
R540-89-8. File and record documentation. 
R640-89-9. Misrepresentation of policy provisions: Prohibited acts applicable 
to all insurers. 
R540-89-10. Failure to acknowledge pertinent communications. 
R540-89-11. Standards for prompt investigation of claims. 
R540-89-12. Minimum standards for prompt, fair and equitable settlements 
applicable to all insurers. 
R540-89-13. Standards for prompt, fair and equitable settlements applicable to 
automobile insurance. 
R540-89-14. Unfair claims settlement practices applicable to automobile 
insurance. 
R54G-89-15. Penalties. 
R540-89-16. Severability. 
R540-89-17. Effective date, 
R540-89-1. Authority 
This rule is promulgated pursuant to Section 31A-201(1) and 
31A-2-201(3)(a) in which the Commissioner is empowered to administer 
and enforce this title and to make rules to implement the provisions of 
this title. Further authority to provide for timely payment of claims is 
provided by Section 31A-26-301(l). Matters relating to proof and notice 
of loss are promulgated pursuant to sections 31A-26-301 and 
31A-21-312(5). Authority to promulgate rules defining unfair claims 
settlement practices or acts is provided in Section 31A-26-303(4). Sec-
tion 31A-2-308(l)(a) provides for penalties for any person who violates 
any insurance statute or rule. 
History. —Effective December 1,1982; formerly Regulation 82-3; effective September 14, 
1989. 
R540-89-2. Purpose 
The business of insurance continues to be one of public trust assumed 
by persons accepting licenses to operate in this State and inherently 
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includes a duty to treat claimants fairly, equitably and in good faith. 
The breach of such duty is considered to be an unfair or deceptive 
business practice and injurious to the insuring public. JThe purpose of 
this rule ia toxespond to the volume of complaints arising from claims 
settlement practices by affirmatively establishing standards of equity 
and good faith to guide licensees in the settlement of claims. Further-
more, as the standards are properly followed by all licensees, it should 
encourage future self-regulation of the insurance industry. It is in-
tended that this rule will help to establish parity between the public and 
professional insurance licensees and facilitate the prompt and fair set-
tlement of insurance claims. 
History.—Effective December 1,1982; formerly Regulation 82-3; effective September 14, 
1989. 
R540-89-3. Scope 
This rule defines certain minimum standards which, if violated, may 
constitute unfair claims settlement practices. All agency actions will be 
conducted pursuant to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. Penal-
ties for violation of this rule shall be in accordance with Sec-
tion 31A-2-308, Utah Code. This rule applies to all persons and to all 
insurance policies, contracts and transactions. Individual agents, bro-
kers, consultants, and adjusters are subject to these standards, as well 
as other persons herein defined. This rule is not exclusive, and other 
acts, not herein specified, may also be considered to be violations of the 
insurance code or other rules. This rule is regulatory in nature and is 
not intended to create a private right of action. 
History.—Effective December 1,1982; formerly Regulation 82-3; effective September 14, 
1989. 
R540-89-4. Definitions 
A- "Agent" means any individual, corporation, association, organiza-
tion, partnership or other legal entity authorized to represent an in-
surer with respect to a claim, whether or not licensed within the State 
of Utah to do so. 
B. "Claim" means, for the purpose of this Rule, a request or a de-
mand on an insurer, whether by a first party or a third party, for 
payment of benefits according to the terms of an insurance policy. 
C. "Claimant" means either a first party claimant, a third party 
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claimant, or both and includes such claimant's designated legal repre-
sentative and includes a member of the claimant's immediate family 
designated by the claimant; 
D. "First party claimant" means an individual, corporation, associa-
tion, partnership or other legal entity asserting a right to payment 
under an insurance policy or insurance contract arising out of the 
occurrence of the contingency or loss covered by such policy or con-
tract. For the purposes of this Rule, certificate holders of group dis-
ability policies are considered to be first party claimants; 
E. "General business practice" means a pattern of conduct. 
F. "Insurance policy" or "insurance contract" shall mean any con-
tract of insurance, indemnity, medical or hospital service, suretyship, or 
annuity issued, proposed for issuance, or intended for issuance by any 
person; 
G. "Insurer" means a person who may issue or who does issue any 
insurance policy or insurance contract within this state, whether or not 
licensed to do so. 
H. "Investigation" means all activities of an insurer directly or indi-
rectly related to the determination of liabilities under coverages af-
forded by an insurance policy or insurance contract; 
I. "Notice of Loss" shall be that notice which is in accordance with 
policy provisions and insurer practices. "Notice of Loss" shall include 
"Special Notice of Loss" as defined herein. Notice of loss shall also 
include a Notice of Default or Notice of Delinquency to mortgage 
insurers. 
J. "Notification of claim" means any notification, whether in writing 
or other means acceptable under the terms of an insurance policy or 
insurance contract, to an insurer or its agent, by a claimant, which 
reasonably apprises the insurer of the facts pertinent to a claim; 
K. "Person" shall mean any individual, corporation, association, part-
nership, reciprocal exchange, self-insurer, interinsurer, Lloyds insurer, 
fraternal benefit society, and any other legal entity engaged in the 
business of insurance, including agents, brokers, consultants and ad-
justers. 
L. "Proof of Loss" shall mean, reasonable documentation by the 
insured as to the facts of the loss and the amount of the claim. 
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M. "Special Notice of Loss" shall mean Notice of Loss required to be 
given by means other than first class mail, such as by telephone or 
facsimile, or at times which could be other than during normal business 
hours. 
N. "Specific Disclosure" shall mean notice to the insured by means of 
policy provisions in boldface type or a separate written notice mailed or 
delivered to the insured. 
0. "Third party claimant" means any individual, corporation, associa-
tion, partnership or other legal entity asserting a claim against any 
individual, corporation, association, partnership or other legal entity 
insured under an insurance policy or insurance contract of an insurer. 
History.-Effective December 1,1982, formerly Regulation 82-3; effective September 14, 
1989 
R540-89-5. Notice of loss 
A. Notice of loss to an insurer, if required, shall be considered timely 
if made according to the terms of the policy, subject to the definitions 
and provisions of this rule. 
B. Notice of Loss may be given by an insured to any appointed agent, 
authorized adjuster, or other authorized representative of an insurer 
unless the insurer clearly directs otherwise by means of Specific Disclo-
sure as defined herein. 
C. Subject to policy provisions a requirement of written or Special 
Notice of Loss may be waived by any appointed agent, authorized 
adjuster, or other authorized representative of the insurer. 
D. If Special Notice of Loss is required, the insured shall be advised 
by Specific Disclosure, as defined herein. 
E. Insurance policies shall not require Notice of Loss to be given in a 
manner which is inconsistent with the actual practice of the insurer. An 
insurer shall not generally conduct business on the basis of waivers of 
right, enforcing the terms of the contract only in exceptional circum-
stances. For example, if the general practice of the insurer is to accept 
Notice of Loss by telephone, the policy shall reflect that practice, and 
not require that the insured furnish "immediate written notice" of loss. 
History.-Effective September 14, 1989 
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R540-89-6. Proof of loss 
A. Proof of loss to an insurer, if required, shall be considered timely if 
made according to the terms of the policy, subject to the definitions and 
provisions of this rule. 
B. The requirements of Section 31A-21-312(l)(a) and (b) may be 
satisfied in practice and do not require that the actual language of the 
above-noted sections be recited in the policy. 
History.-Effective September 14,1989. 
R540-89-7. Unfair methods, deceptive acts and practices defined 
The following are hereby defined as unfair methods of competition 
and unfair or deceptive acts and practices in the business of insurance, 
and the commission of which are violations of this rule: 
A- Denying or threatening the denial of the payment of claims or 
rescinding, cancelling or threatening the rescission or cancellation of 
coverage under a policy for any reason which is not clearly described in 
the policy as a reason for such denial, cancellation or rescission. 
B. Failing to provide the insured or beneficiary with a written expla-
nation of the evidence of any investigation or file materials giving rise 
to the denial of a claim based on misrepresentation or fraud on an 
insurance application, when such misrepresentation is the basis for the 
, denial. 
C. Compensation by an insurer of its employees, agents or contrac-
tors of any amounts which are based on savings to the insurer as a 
result of denying the payment of claims. 
D. Failing to delivery a copy of standards for prompt investigation of 
claims to the Insurance Department when requested to do so. 
E. Refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investiga-
tion. 
F. Offering first party claimants substantially less than the reason-
able value of the claim. Such value may be established by one or more 
independent sources. 
G. Making claim payments to insureds or beneficiaries not accompa-
nied by a statement or explanation of benefits setting forth the cover-
age under which the payments are being made and how the payment 
amount was calculated. 
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H. Failing to pay claims within 30 days of properly executed proof of 
loss when liability is reasonably clear under one coverage in order to 
influence settlements under other portions of the insurance policy cov-
erage or under other policies of insurance. 
I. Refusing payment of a claim solely on the basis of an insured's 
request to do so unless: 
1. the insured claims sovereign, eleemosynary, diplomatic, military 
service, or other immunity from suit or liability with respect to such 
claim; or 
2. the insured is granted the right under the policy of insurance to 
consent to settlement of claims. 
J. Advising a claimant not to obtain the services of an attorney or 
suggesting the claimant will receive less money if an attorney is used to 
pursue or advise on the merits of a claim. 
K. Misleading a claimant as to the applicable statute of limitations. 
L. Requiring an insured to sign a release that extends beyond the 
occurrence or cause of action that gave rise to the claims payment 
M. Deducting from a loss or claims payment made under one policy 
those premiums owed by the insured on another policy unless the 
insured consents. 
N. Failing to settle a first party claim on the basis that responsibility 
for payment of the claim should be assumed by others, except as may 
otherwise be provided by policy provisions. 
0. Issuing checks or drafts in partial settlement of a loss or a claim 
under a specified coverage when such check or draft contains language 
wrhich purports to release the insurer or its insured from total liability. 
P. Refusing to provide a written basis for the denial of a claim upon 
demand of the insured. 
Q. Denial of a claim for medical treatment after preauthorization has 
been given, except in cases where the insurer obtains and provides to 
the claimant documentation of the pre-existence of the condition for 
which the preauthorization has been given or if the claimant is not 
eligible for coverage. 
R. Refusal to pay reasonably incurred expenses to an insured when 
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such expenses resulted from a delay, as prohibited by these rules, in 
claims settlement or claims payment 
S. When an automobile insurer represents both a tort feasor and a 
claimant: 
a. failing to advise a claimant under any coverage that the same 
insurance company represents both the tort feasor and the claimant as 
soon as such information becomes known to the insurer; 
b. allocating medical payments to the tort feasor's liability coverage 
before exhausting a claimant's personal injury protection coverage. 
T. Failure to pay interest at the legal rate, as provided in Title 15, 
Utah Code, upon amounts that are overdue under these rules. 
History.— Effective December 1,1982; formerly Regulation 82-3; effective September 14, 
1989. 
R540-89-8. File and record documentation 
The insurer's claim files shall be subject to examination by the 
Commissioner or by his duly appointed designees. Such files shall con-
tain all notes and work papers pertaining to the claim in such detail 
that pertinent events and the dates of such events can be recon-
structed. 
History.—Effective December 1,1982; formerly Regulation 82-3; effective September 14, 
1989. 
R540-89-9, Misrepresentation of policy provisions: Prohibited 
acts applicable to all insurers 
A. No insurer shall fail to folly disclose to first party claimants all 
pertinent benefits, coverages or other provisions of an insurance policy 
or insurance contract under which a claim is presented, including loss 
of use and household services. 
B. No agent shall conceal from first party claimants benefits, cover-
ages or other provisions of any insurance policy or insurance contract 
when such benefits, coverages or other provisions are pertinent to a 
claim. 
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C. No insurer shall deny a claim for failure to exhibit the property 
without proof of demand and unfounded refusal by a claimant to do so. 
History.-Effective December 1,1982; formerly Regulation 82-3; effective September 14, 
1999. 
R540-89-10. Failure to acknowledge pertinent communications 
A. Every insurer, upon receiving notification of a claim shall, within 
15 days, acknowledge the receipt of such notice unless payment is made 
within such period of time, or unless the insurer has a reason accept-
able to the Insurance Department as to why such acknowledgement 
cannot be made within the time specified. 
B. Every insurer, upon receipt of an inquiry from the Insurance 
Department respecting a claim shall, within fifteen days of receipt of 
such inquiry, furnish the Department with a substantive response to 
the inquiry. 
C. A substantive response shall be made within 15 days on all other 
pertinent communications from a claimant which reasonably suggest 
that a response is expected. 
D. Every insurer, upon receiving notification of claim shall promptly 
provide necessary claim forms, instructions, and reasonable assistance 
so that first party claimants can comply with the policy conditions and 
the insurer's reasonable requirements. 
History.—Effective December 1,1982; formerly Regulation 82-3; effective September 14, 
1989. 
R540-89-11. Standards for prompt investigation of claims 
Every insurer shall complete investigation of a claim within 45 days 
after notification of claim, unless such investigation cannot reasonably 
be completed within such time. It shall be the burden of the insurer to 
establish, by adequate records, that the investigation could not be 
completed within 45 days of its notification of such claim* 
History.—Effective December 1,1982; formerly Regulation 82-3; effective September 14, 
1989. 
R540-89-12. Minimum standards for prompt, fair and equitable 
settlements applicable to all insurers 
A- The insurer shall provide to the claimant a statement of the time 
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and manner in which any claim must be made and the type of proof of 
loss required by the insurer. 
B. Within 30 days after receipt by the insurer of properly executed 
notice of loss, the insurer shall complete its investigation of the claim 
and the first party claimant shall be advised of the acceptance or denial 
of the claim by the insurer unless the investigation cannot reasonably 
be completed within that time. If the investigation cannot be completed 
within 30 days the insurer shall so communicate to the claimant and 
shall continue to so communicate at least every 30 days until the claim 
is either paid or denied. No insurer shall deny a claim on the grounds of 
a specific provision, condition, or exclusion unless reference to such 
provision, condition or exclusion is included in the denial. Any basis for 
the denial of a claim shall be noted in the insurer's claim file and must 
be communicated promptly and in writing to the claimant. 
C. Unless otherwise provided by law, an insurer shall promptly pay 
every valid insurance claim. A claim shall be overdue if not paid within 
30 days after the insurer is furnished written notice of the fact of a 
covered loss and of the amount of the loss. Payment shall mean actual 
delivery or mailing of the amount owed. If such written notice is not 
furnished to the insurer as to the entire claim, any partial amount 
supported by written notice or investigation is overdue if not paid 
within 30 days. Any payment shall not be deemed overdue when the 
insurer has reasonable proof to establish that the insurer is not respon-
sible for the payment, notwithstanding that written notice has been 
furnished to the insurer. 
D. If negotiations are continuing for settlement of a claim with a 
claimant, notice of expiration of statute of limitation or contract time 
limit shall be given to the claimant at least 60 days before the date on 
which such time limit may expire. 
E. No insurer shall make statements which indicate that the rights of 
a third party claimant may be impaired if a form of release is not 
completed within a given period of time unless the statement is given 
for the purpose of notifying the third party claimant of the provision of 
a statute of limitations. 
F. Proof of loss requirements may not be unreasonable and should 
consider all of the circumstances surrounding a given claim. 
History. —Effective December 1,1982; formerly Regulation 82-3; effective September 14, 
1989. 
283 
Revised, 1990-1 © 1990, NILS Publishing Company 
R540-89-13 UTAH REGULATIONS 
R540-89-13. Standards for prompt, fair and equitable settlements 
applicable to automobile insurance 
A. When the insurance policy provides for the adjustments and set-
tlement of first party automobile total losses on the basis of actual cash 
value or replacement with another of like kind and quality, one of the 
following methods must apply: 
(1) The insurer may elect to offer a replacement automobile which is 
a specific comparable automobile available to the insured, with all ap-
plicable taxes, license fees and other fees incident to transfer of evi-
dence o£ ownership of the automobile paid, at no cost other than any 
deductible provided in the policy. The offer and any rejection thereof 
must be documented in the claim file. 
(2) The insurer may elect a cash settlement based upon the actual 
cost, less any deductible provided in the policy, to purchase a compara-
ble automobile including all applicable taxes, license fees and other fees 
incident to transfer of evidence of ownership of a comparable automo-
bile. Such cost may be determined by: 
(a) The cost of a comparable automobile in the local market area 
when a comparable automobile is available in the local market area; or 
(b) One of two or more quotations obtained by the insurer from two 
or more qualified dealers located within the local market area when a 
comparable automobile is not available in the local market area. 
(3) When a first party automobile total loss is settled on a basis which 
deviates from the methods described in subsections A(l) and A(2) of 
this section, the deviation must be supported by documentation giving 
particulars of the automobile condition. Any deductions from such cost, 
including deductions for salvage, must be measurable, itemized and 
specified as to dollar amount and shall be appropriate in amount The 
basis for such settlement shall be fully explained to the first party 
claimant 
B. Total loss settlements with a third party claimant shall be on the 
basis of the market value or actual cost of a comparable automobfle at 
the time of loss. Settlement procedures shall be in accordance with 
paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection A 
C. Where liability and damages are reasonably clear, insurers shall 
not recommend that third party claimants make a claim under their 
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own policies solely to avoid paying claims under such insurer's insur-
ance policy or insurance contract 
D. Insurers shall not require a claimant to travel an unreasonable 
distance to inspect a replacement automobile, to obtain a repair esti-
mate or to have the automobile repaired at a specific repair shop. 
E. Insurers shall, upon the claimant's request, include the first party 
claimant's deductible, if any, in subrogation demands initiated by the 
insurer. Subrogation recoveries may be shared on a proportionate basis 
with the first party claimant when an agreement is reached for less 
than the full amount of the loss, unless the deductible amount has been 
otherwise recovered. The recovery shall be applied first to reimburse 
the first party claimant for the amount or share of the deductible when 
the full amount or share of the deductible has been recovered. No 
deduction for expenses can be made from the deductible recovery un-
less an outside attorney is retained to collect such recovery. The deduc-
tion may then be for only a pro rata share of the allocated loss 
adjustment expense. If subrogation is initiated but discontinued, the 
insured shall be advised. 
F. If an insurer prepares or approves an estimate of the cost of 
automobile repairs, such estimate shall be in an amount for which it 
may be reasonably expected the damage can be satisfactorily repaired. 
If the insurer prepares an estimate, it shall give a copy of the estimate 
to the claimant and may furnish to the claimant the names of one or 
more conveniently located repair shops. 
G. When the amount claimed is reduced because of betterment or 
depreciation, all information for such reduction shall be contained in 
the claim file. Such deductions shall be itemized and specified as to 
dollar amount and shall be appropriate for the amount of deductions. 
H. When the insurer elects to repair and designates a specific repair 
shop for automobile repairs, the insurer shall cause the damaged auto-
mobile to be restored to its condition prior to the loss at no additional 
cost to the claimant other than as stated in the policy and within a 
reasonable period of time. 
I. Where coverage exists, loss of use payment shall be made to a 
claimant for the reasonably incurred cost of transportation, or for the 
reasonably incurred rental cost of a substitute vehicle, including colli-
sion damage waiver, during the period the automobile is necessarily 
withdrawn from service to obtain parts or effect repair, or, in the event 
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the automobile is a total loss and the claim has been timely made, 
during the period from the date of loss until a reasonable settlement 
offer has been made by the insurer. The insurer may not refuse to pay 
for loss of use for the period that the insurer is examining the claim or 
making other determinations as to the payability of the loss, unless 
such delay reveals that the insurer is not liable to pay the claim. Loss of 
use payments shall be an amount in addition to the payment for the 
value of the automobile. 
J. Subject to subsection A and B, an insurer shall fairly and equitably 
and in good faith attempt to compensate a claimant for all losses in-
curred under collision or comprehensive coverage. Such compensation 
shall be based at least, but not exclusively, upon the following stan-
dards: 
1. An offer of settlement shall not be made exclusively on the basis of 
useful life of the part or vehicle damaged. 
2. An estimate of the amount of compensation for the claimant shall 
include the actual wear and tear„ or lack thereof, of the damaged part 
or vehicle. 
3. Actual cash value shall take into account the cost of replacement of 
the vehicle and/or the part for which compensation is claimed. 
4. An actual estimate of the true useful life remaining in the part or 
vehicle shall be taken into account in establishing the amount of com-
pensation of a claim. 
5. Actual cash value shall include taxes and other fees which shall be 
incurred by a claimant in replacing the part or vehicle or in compensat-
ing the claimant for the loss incurred. 
K An insurer may not demand reimbursement of Personal Injury 
Protection payments from a first-party insured of payments received by 
that party from a settlement or judgement against a third party. 
History.-Effective December 1,1982; formerly Regulation 82-3; effective September 14, 
1989. 
R540-89-14. Unfair claims settlement practices applicable to 
automobile insurance 
The following acts or practices are defined as unfair claims settle-
ment practices pertaining to automobile insurance: 
A- Using as a basis for cash settlement with a claimant an amount 
286 
Revised, 1990-1 © 1990, NILS Publishing Company 
UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT R540-89-14 
which is less than the amount which the insurer would be charged if 
repairs were made, unless such amount is agreed to by the claimant or 
provided for by the insurance policy. 
B. Refusing to settle a claim based solely upon the issuance or failure 
to issue a traffic citation by a policy agency. 
C. If an application for benefits is required by the insurer, failing to 
provide a section for each coverage under the policy under which the 
claimant can make a claim. 
D. Failing to, in good faith, disclose all coverages, including loss of 
use, household services, and any other coverages available to the claim-
ant 
E. Requiring a claimant to use only the insurer's claim service in 
order to perfect a claim. 
F. If the insurer makes a deduction for the salvage value of a total 
loss retained by the claimant, failing to furnish the claimant with the 
name and address of the salvage dealer who will purchase the salvage 
for the amount deducted if so requested by the claimant. 
G. Refusing to disclose policy limits when requested to do so by a 
claimant or claimant's attorney. 
H. Using a release on the back of a check or draft which requires a 
claimant to release the company from obligation on further claims in 
order to process a current claim when the company knows or reason-
ably should know that there will be future liability on the part of the 
insurer. 
I. Refusing to use a separate release of claims document rather than 
one on the back of a check or draft when requested to do so by a 
claimant. 
J. Intentionally offering less money to a first party claimant than the 
claim is reasonably worth, a practice referred to as "low-balling." 
K Refusing to offer to pay claims based upon the Doctrine of Com-
parative Negligence without a reasonable basis for doing so. 
L. In a bailment situation, imputing the negligence of a permissive 
user of a vehicle to the owner of the vehicle. 
History.-Effective September 14,1989. 
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R540-89-15. Penalties 
Subject to the provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, 
violators of this rule shall be subject to fine, suspension, or revocation 
of their insurance license or Certificate of Authority, and/or any other 
penalties or measures as are determined by the commissioner in accor-
dance with law. Any penalty imposed under this rule shall be commen-
surate with the violation committed and subject to the following 
provisions and limitations: 
A Separate and disparate penalties may be assessed insurer, organi-
zation and individual persons; 
B. Frequency of occurrence and severity of detriment to the public 
shall be considered in determining a penalty; 
C. No license or Certificate of Authority shall be suspended on the 
basis of a single violation; and 
D. No revocation of license or Certificate of Authority shall occur 
except upon a finding of improper conduct as a general business prac-
tice. 
History.—Effective December 1,1982; formerly Regulation 82-3; Effective September 14, 
1989. 
R540-89-16. Severability 
If any provision or clause of this rule or the application thereof to any 
person or situation is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any 
other provision or application of the regulation which can be given 
effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the 
provisions of this rule are declared to be severable. 
History.-Effective December 1,1982; formerly Regulation 82-3; effective September 14, 
1989. 
R540-89-17. Effective date 
This rule shall take effect on September 14,1989. 
History.-Effective September 14,1989. 
[Page 287 follows] 
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127 South 500 East 
Suite 510. P O Box 45440 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84145-0440 
Telephone. (801) 363-3057 
Utah Toil Free. 1-800-634-4201 
August 24, 1989 
McRae <5c DeLand, Attys. at Law 
209 East 100 North 
Vernal, UT 84078 
Attn: Robert M. McRae 
RE: JOANNE E. BAXTER AND MARY ELLEN BOULTER - JAREN BAXTER 
OUR CLAIM f's: AL 667-01097^-01 H, 02 H 
DATE OF ACCIDENT: 04/28/89 
Dear Mr. McRae: 
This will acknowledge our belated receipt of your letter dated July 12, 1989 and 
its enclosures. When you called to discuss it on August 8th, I advised you that we 
never received the original letter and enclosures and you, therefore, FAXed copies 
to me. 
We are handling No-Fault and Medical Payment files in the names of both of your 
clients as named above. I understand that you are attempting to pursue a liability 
claim against the parties who were responsible in this accident, and you served 
them with a Summons and Complaint in order to protect your client's interest. You 
have advised me that the defendant is in the process of moving to the state of 
Oregon and voiced to me your concern regarding that complication. 
So far, we have paid only No-Fault coverage out on both of your clients. On Joanne 
Baxter's claim, we have paid out a total of $3,356.10 in No-Fault benefits, $1,278.70 
of which was for medical bills and the remainder of which was wage reimbursement. 
On Mary Ellen Boulter's claim, we have paid a total of $542.24 in No-Fault medical 
benefits to date. Each of these claimants has an additional $1,000 in Medical 
Payments coverage available under the terms of this policy, once the No-Fault 
benefits are exhausted. 
If I understand your intentions, you are interested in placing an Uninsured Motorist 
claim on the behalf of each of these two claimants, with regard to the 
above-captioned accident. Provided you can show reasonable evidence that the 
responsible party is not insured, I don't have a problem with honoring such a claim, 
assuming that the injured parties are shown to have crossed the Utah No-Fault 
theshold, which would make them eligible to place a liability claim in this state. 
As the medical bills which I have paid show that your clients have not crossed the 
No-Fault theshold by virtue of the amount of medical bills incurred to date, perhaps 
you are able to provide me with medical reports which shows that they have crossed 
the threshold in one of the other possible ways. 
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In the meantime, I am having Uninsured Motorist claim files set up for each of 
your clients, which will be separate from their No-Fault and Medical Payment 
claim files. By the time I hear back from you on this, I will have the new claim 
file numbers and be able to provide you with those for your records and future 
correspondence. 
If you have any questions or comments regarding this matter in the meantime, 
please do not hestitate to contact me. Otherwise, I will await the evidence regarding 
the Uninsured Motorist situation and the eligibility to place the liability claims 
from your office. 
Very truly yours, 
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
Tracy Birdsong 
Technical Claims Specialist 
TB/kl/026 
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Mr, Tracy Bi rdsong , Technica l Claims S p e c i a l i s t 
L i b e r t y Mutual Insurance Company 
P.O. Box 45440 A K 
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84145-0440 ^ 
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Re: Joann E. Baxter and Mary E l l en Boul te r -
B a x t e r , Your claims # ' x : AL 667-010979999-01 H, 02 H 
Date of Acc iden t : 4/28/89 
Jaren 
Dear Ms. Birdsong: 
In as much as you decline to participate in the 
investigation of whether or not Daryl Crape was insured at the 
time of the subject accident as evidenced with your letter of 
August 25, 1989, I went ahead and had the plaintiffs testify 
in support of a default judgment, a copy of which is 
enclosed. Please advise as to what your attitude is going to 
be about paying the same. 
Sincerely, 
Robert M. McRae 
RMM:p 
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